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We examine how bank funding structure and securitization activities affect the currency
denomination of business loans. We analyze a unique dataset that includes information on the
requested and granted loan currency for 99,490 loans granted to 57,464 firms by a Bulgarian
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show that loan currency, as well as loan amount and maturity, are adjusted to make loans
eligible for securitization.
(90 words)
Keywords: foreign currency debt, bank funding, securitization
JEL classification numbers: G21, G32, F34
___________________________________________________________________________
* Martin Brown: University of St. Gallen (e-mail: martin.brown@unisg.ch ),
** Karolin Kirschenmann: Aalto University School of Business (e-mail:
karolin.kirschenmann@aalto.fi),
***  Steven  Ongena:  CentER  –  Tilburg  University  and  CEPR  (e-mail:
steven.ongena@tilburguniversity.nl )
Acknowledgements: We  thank  Mario  Bersem,  Giorgio  Gobbi,  Hans-Martin  Hagen,  Carsten
Hubensack, Lars Norden, Alex Popov, Koen Schoors, Livio Stracca, Eva Terberger, Neven Valev,
Adalbert Winkler, reader-session participants at the Swiss National Bank, seminar participants at
Tilburg University, KfW, the Sveriges Riksbank, the Bulgarian National Bank, the Dutch National
Bank, CESifo, the European Central Bank, Aalto University School of Business, Solvay Business
School and Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, as well as participants at the 39th Annual
Meeting of the European Finance Association (Copenhagen), the 2012 Dubrovnik Economic
Conference, the 2010 Changing Geography of Money, Banking and Finance in a Post-Crisis World
Conference (Ancona), the 34th Annual Meeting of the Finnish Economic Association, the 2010
Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (Fribourg), the 6th Annual
Conference of the Research Committee Development Economics of the German Economic
Association (Hanover), the EBRD-G20-RBWC conference on Developing Local Currency Finance
(London), the 3rd Cass Business School Conference on Emerging Markets Finance (London), the 2009
Münster–Banken Workshop, and the 9th ESCB Workshop on Emerging Markets (Frankfurt) for
helpful comments. This paper was previously circulated under the title “Foreign Currency Loans -
Demand or Supply Driven?”. We are particularly grateful to the management and employees of the
bank which provided us with the data. Kirschenmann thanks the Finance Department of Tilburg
University for its hospitality while writing this paper.
11 Introduction
Does the asset-liability management of banks lead them to extend loans with unfavorable
terms  to  unsuspecting  clients?  And  does  financial  innovation  –  such  as  the  potential  to
securitize loans – amplify such behavior? In the wake of the financial crisis many
commentators have argued that banks may have carelessly or even deceitfully “over-sold”
risky credit products to their customers,1 and that securitization may have played a pivotal
role in this behavior.
This paper takes a step in substantiating the above claims by analyzing the striking casus
of foreign currency lending in Eastern Europe during the run-up to the financial crisis.
Foreign currencies and especially the euro played an important role for domestic financial
transactions in Eastern Europe. On average, 52% of loans in the region were granted in
foreign currencies and 40% of customer deposits were held in foreign currency with the euro
being by far the most important currency (ECB 2007). Recent survey evidence suggests that
the propensity of retail clients to take foreign currency loans has not declined even in the
aftermath of substantial currency depreciations during the financial crisis (Beckmann,
Scheiber and Stix 2011).
 The risks arising from foreign currency lending to retail clients, i.e. households and small
firms, in countries like Hungary, Poland or Ukraine were widely understood before the
crisis,2 and were met by policy makers with a broad set of regulatory instruments (ECB
1 For early examples from the U.S. see Bloomberg Businessweek (11/09/2006) and New York Times (6/6/2009),
and recently the $85 million civil money penalty against Wells Fargo that was levied partly for “steering
potential prime borrowers into more costly subprime loans” (Federal Reserve Board, Press Release 20/7/2011).
2 “The point to grasp about Eastern Europe is that … the debt is plagued by currency mismatches because in
recent years households (and to a lesser extent, corporates) have increasingly chosen to borrow in low-interest
currencies …it has shades of the Asian tigers back in 1997.” (Financial Times, 29/9/2007).
22010). In the aftermath of the crisis policy makers in the region have also taken measures to
cushion the impact of exchange rate depreciations on unhedged borrowers (Brown and Lane
2011).
Mirroring the debate over irresponsible lending in the US subprime market, the blame for
excessive foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe has been laid at the door of the
lenders. These have been accused of “pushing” euro loans onto their clients as a result of
their substantial funding in euro obtained from their (Western European) parent banks. While
recent bank-level evidence questions the role of international funding as a driver of foreign
currency lending (Brown and De Haas 2012), recent policy measures e.g. in Hungary, are still
based on the premise that the banks are to blame.3
In this paper we examine to what extent bank funding structures and securitization
activities affect the currency denomination of loans in Bulgaria. Our analysis is based on a
unique bank dataset that contains 99,490 business loans granted to 57,464 firms during the
period 2003-2007. In contrast to previous studies and crucial for our purposes we observe not
only the currency as stated in the loan contract but also the borrower’s requested currency.
We are therefore able to examine to what extent the currency denomination of loans is driven
by supply side factors such as foreign currency funding and securitization.
The bank at the heart of our analysis is focused on retail lending making it an interesting
object of study, since especially retail clients have been most involved in foreign currency
transactions throughout Eastern Europe. As with the majority of banks in the region, the bank
is mainly foreign owned and has substantial funding in foreign currency. Similar to other
3 Foreign currency debt relief measures recently implemented by Hungarian authorities include the possibility
for borrowers to repay their foreign currency loans early at below market exchange rates. In the first three weeks
after the measure was introduced Hungarian banks were estimated to have lost 151 Million US dollars due to
this policy (Bloomberg Businessweek, 3/11/2011).
3retail banks in Bulgaria and the Eastern European region as a whole, loans in foreign
currency make up a substantial share (27 percent) of the bank’s portfolio.
At a first glance, Bulgaria may seem an odd country to study foreign currency lending, as
the country maintains a currency board in which the exchange rate of the local currency
(Bulgarian lev) is fixed towards the euro. This currency board held throughout our
observation period, so that there was almost no actual exchange rate volatility. However, this
by no means implies that firms or banks in Bulgaria were confident that a depreciation of the
local currency would not happen. Indeed, Carlson and Valev (2008) report survey evidence
suggesting that in 2004 14 percent (25 percent) of Bulgarians believed the currency board
might collapse with a sharp devaluation within the next twelve months (five years). An
advantage of the currency board, for the purpose of this paper, is that the Bulgarian
authorities imposed no limits on open euro foreign exchange positions of banks. Thus we can
study the currency composition of bank-lending in an unrestricted policy environment.
We analyze if changes in the currency denomination of the bank’s own funding and the
potential to securitize loans drives the bank to extend loans in foreign currency although they
are requested in local currency. To identify supply-side drivers of foreign currency credit, we
rely on an exogenous policy experiment that took place during the sample period. In April
2005 the Bulgarian Government increased reserve requirements to stem a credit boom. The
bank reacted by accelerating its existing plans to securitize part of its loan portfolio, but
capital market imperfections implied it could only securitize loans denominated in foreign
currency, and that were of a certain eligible size and maturity. We compare the switching of
loan currency by the bank for eligible and non-eligible loans before and after the initiation of
securitization.
4We find that almost one-third of the loans disbursed by the bank in foreign currency were
initially requested in local currency. Our results show that the bank is more likely to grant a
loan in euro if the firm is of lower observable credit risk and if the requested loan is large and
long-term. Importantly we find a significant relation between the bank’s funding structure, its
securitization activities and its propensity to switch loans to foreign currency. The bank is
more likely to switch loans to euro when it has more customer funding in euro. The potential
to securitize euro-denominated loans from 2006 onwards is also associated with an increased
propensity to switch loan currency to euro. We find that only those loans which are eligible
for securitization based on their loan amount and maturity are more likely to be switched to
euro after the commencement of the securitization deal. Finally, we document that the bank
not only switched the currency denomination to make loans eligible for securitization. The
bank also increasingly changed the amount and maturity of loans to adhere to the eligibility
criteria for securitization. We thus identify securitization as a driver of simultaneous changes
in loan currency, amount and maturity.
In sum, our results show that a substantial share of foreign currency retail lending in
Eastern Europe may be supply-driven, with banks potentially hesitant to lend long-term in
local currency, eager to match the currency structure of their assets and liabilities, and eager
to take advantage of the opportunities for securitization.
Our paper aims to contribute to three growing strands of the literature. First, we add to the
existing evidence on the determinants of foreign currency borrowing by firms. While the
majority of this literature focuses on the choice of foreign versus local currency debt by large
5corporates,4 more recent evidence has also examined loan currency choice by small firms
(Brown, Ongena and Yesin 2011) and households (Fidrmuc, Hake and Stix 2013; Beer,
Ongena and Peter 2010). In contrast to these studies, our data allows us to disentangle
whether the currency denomination of a loan is determined by the clients and/or the bank as
we observe both the requested and the granted loan currency.
Second, our paper contributes to a broader literature that links the banks’ own funding to
granted loan terms and credit availability. Berlin and Mester (1999), for example, tie bank
funding to bank orientation, showing that banks with better access to rate-inelastic core
deposits engage in more loan rate smoothing (relationship lending) than banks that lack such
access. And recently Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that banks with more funding
from core deposits reduced their syndicated lending less during the recent financial crisis than
banks without access to this stable source of funding.
In our setting the banks’ supply of foreign currency loans similarly depends on their own
access to foreign currency refinancing (Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas 2010). Many
banks in Emerging Europe have substantial liabilities in euro due to their foreign ownership.
At the same time they have limited access to instruments that hedge foreign currency
positions due to the weakly developed forward markets. As a consequence, banks may lend in
foreign currencies to prevent currency mismatches on their own balance sheets (Luca and
Petrova 2008, Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler and Tiffin 2007), especially if they expect
4 See Keloharju and Niskanen (2001), Martinez and Werner (2002), Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003),
Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003), Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005), Kedia and Mozumdar (2003),
Gelos (2003), and Cowan (2006) for evidence from various countries.
6that they will be bailed out in the case of credit losses due to currency depreciations
(Ranciere, Tornell and Vamvakidis 2010).5
Third, our work fits in an important nascent literature that investigates the role played by
financial innovation, securitization in particular, in the run-up to the current financial crisis.
On the one hand, Keys, Seru and Vig (2012) and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010)
show a connection between the ease of securitization and screening in the low documentation
subprime market in the U.S. Similarly, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) find that the softening
of lending standards in the U.S. and Europe following low short-term interest rates was
amplified by securitization activity, and Kara, Marqués-Ibáñez and Ongena (2011) show that
banks in Europe that were more active at originating asset-backed securities were also more
aggressive in their loan pricing practices. On the other hand, Benmelech, Dlugosz and
Ivashina (2012) for example find that within a Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO)
portfolio only loans that were originated by the bank that acts as the CLO underwriter
underperformed the rest of the loan portfolio. Hence securitization per se need not lead to
softer lending standards.
Our results are similarly qualified. Securitization, on the one hand, seemingly incentivizes
the bank to switch borrowers to a foreign currency loan entailing immediate foreign currency
risk for the borrower though possibly also indirect future credit risk for the bank. On the other
hand, we find that the bank expanded its lending in foreign currency by granting foreign
currency loans to the least risky of those clients requesting local currency. Our findings also
5 Luca and Petrova (2008) analyze the aggregate share of foreign currency loans for 21 transition countries
between 1990 and 2003. They find that it is positively related to aggregate export activity, interest rate
differentials, domestic monetary volatility and deposit dollarization, while it is negatively related to the
volatility of the exchange rate. Dollarization is lower in countries with more developed foreign exchange
markets, and credit dollarization is affected by prudential regulations which stipulate tighter open position
limits. See also Arteta (2002), Barajas and Morales (2003), and Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2010).
7complement those of Loutskina and Strahan (2009). They show that securitization reduced
the influence of bank financial conditions on loan supply in the U.S., i.e. securitization
weakened the link from bank funding conditions to credit supply. While the type of
securitization that we observe serves to mitigate the effects of macroprudential regulations
(and to broaden the refinancing basis), at the same time this securitization also changes the
allocation of credit (as in Loutskina 2011) since it leads to more foreign currency
denominated loans as well as fewer large and long-term loans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data while section 3
reports results from univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
Our dataset covers all annuity loans, credit lines and overdrafts extended to firms by one
Bulgarian bank (henceforth called “the Bank”) between April 2003 and September 2007.
Bulgaria is representative of the region-wide “euroization” of the banking sector with 47% of
loans and 40% of deposits denominated in euro. The Bank is a nationwide bank which
focuses on lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. Compared to the aggregate
banking system, where only 41percent of assets are loans to enterprises, 70 percent of the
assets at the Bank are enterprise loans. As with the majority of banks in Bulgaria and the rest
of the region, foreign strategic investors hold a controlling share in the Bank.6
In total the Bank extended 106,091 loans during our observation period. For each
disbursed loan we have information on the loan terms requested by the firm and the terms
6 In  2007  82  percent  of  bank  assets  in  Bulgaria  were  in  the  hands  of  institutions  with  majority  foreign
ownership. In Central and Eastern Europe the average share of foreign bank assets in 2007 was 80 percent.
8granted by the Bank. Crucial to our analysis we observe whether the loan was requested
and/or granted in Bulgarian lev (henceforth we use the currency’s ISO 4217 alphabetic code,
i.e. BGN) or in euro (henceforth EUR). We further have information on firm characteristics
at the time of the loan disbursement. We exclude all observations with missing loan-level or
firm-level data (1,090 observations) and with very large discrepancies between their
requested and granted loan amounts (5,511 observations),7 leaving us with 99,490 loans to
57,464 different firms. We match our loan-level dataset with monthly indicators of the
Bank’s funding structure (funding source and currency) as well as with indicators of
monetary conditions obtained from the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bloomberg. Definitions and summary statistics of all variables are
provided in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
2.1 The Bank’s lending technology and loan portfolio
At the heart of the Bank’s lending technology is a personnel-intensive analysis of the
borrower’s debt capacity.8 A prospective borrower first meets a client advisor who assesses
whether the borrower meets the Bank’s basic requirements. If this is the case, the client fills
in a loan application form. On this form the client indicates her preferred loan amount,
maturity and currency as  well  as  the  purpose  of  the  loan.  The  client  also  has  to  provide
7 We exclude 637 loans with Requested amount/Amount > 2 and 4,874 loans with Requested amount/Amount <
0.5.
8 To gain insights into the usual loan granting process, we have conducted informal interviews with loan officers
and training staff from the Bank’s head office.
9information about the firm ownership, other bank relations and the free cash flow available
for the repayment of the loan.
In a next step, the Bank’s credit administration prepares information on the borrower’s
credit history with the Bank and other banks.9 At the same time, the loan officer conducts a
financial analysis of the firm including a personal visit to the firm to confirm its financial
situation.  The  loan  officer  relays  his  suggested  loan  terms  together  with  the  information
gathered during the financial analysis to the Bank’s credit committee, which then makes the
final decision on the loan terms granted. Since the borrower’s repayment capacity is the core
figure in the analysis, loan amount, maturity and currency are determined first.
The setting of interest rates and collateral requirements then depends on the loan size. For
small loans (up to 50,000 EUR) the collateral requirement and the interest rate on each loan
are fixed, i.e. not negotiated on an individual basis (because small loans comprise the bulk of
the sample, including collateral and/or the loan rate as control variables is therefore
problematic). For medium-sized loans (above 50,000 EUR) collateral requirements and
interest rates are negotiated individually.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 provides an overview of the Bank’s lending activities during our observation
period. Panel A and B display the number and volume of disbursed loans by year. Most loans
in our sample (i.e. 82 percent) are very small, with an amount less than 10,000 EUR, while
only 2% of the loans have an amount which exceeds 50,000 EUR. However, considering the
9 Enterprise loans in Bulgaria are covered both by the public credit registry and a private credit bureau (see
www.doingbusiness.org).
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volume of lending, loans exceeding 10,000 EUR (50,000 EUR) make up 67 percent (31
percent) of the Bank’s loan portfolio. Mortgage loans make up 9 percent of the number of
loans  and  45  percent  of  the  volume of  loans  disbursed  by  the  Bank.  A separate  analysis  of
mortgage loans is warranted in our analysis as residential and commercial properties are
typically quoted in foreign currency in Bulgaria.
Panel  A  also  shows  that  almost  two-thirds  of  the  Bank’s  loans  are  disbursed  to repeat
clients, i.e. borrowers who take out more than one loan during our observation period. The
subsample of loans to repeat clients will be important throughout our empirical exercise as it
allows us to control for unobserved (time-invariant) firm-level characteristics.
Panel  C  of  Table  3  shows  that  a  substantial  share  of  the  Bank’s  lending  is  in  foreign
currency rather than in BGN. Loans denominated in EUR account for 36 percent of the loan
volume disbursed during our observation period.10 This share decreased considerably
between 2003 and 2007, but even in this final year of our observation period more than 30
percent of the disbursed loan volume was in EUR. Panel C further reveals that the share of
EUR loans increases with loan size and is higher for mortgage loans than for non-mortgage
loans.
2.2 Requested and granted loan currency
As we have information on the firms’ requested currency as well as the actual currency of
the loan granted, we are able to establish when the requested currency coincides with the
10 We focus our analysis on foreign currency loans denominated in EUR, since they account for 97.5 percent of
the Bank’s total foreign currency lending. The remaining share of foreign currency loans are in US Dollar.
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granted currency, and how often the Bank switches the loan currency.11 Figure 1 shows that
overall 32 percent of the loans (23 percent of the loan volume) disbursed in EUR were loans
initially requested in BGN by the borrower. Looking at it from the borrowers’ side, 11
percent of the loan volume which was requested in local currency (61 Mio EUR out of 547
Mio EUR) was actually disbursed in foreign currency. This finding already suggests that a
substantial share of foreign currency lending by the Bank is not demand, but supply driven.
By contrast, we find that a negligible share of the number and volume of loans disbursed in
local currency were requested in foreign currency.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 2 shows that the propensity of firms to request and the propensity of the Bank to
grant EUR loans are strongly related to requested loan size, loan maturity and loan purpose.
Figure 2A reveals that the share of loans which is requested in EUR increases with requested
loan size and maturity. The figure further shows that mortgage loans are generally more
likely  to  be  requested  in  EUR  for  any  requested  size  or  maturity.  As  the  share  of  loans
requested in EUR is negligible for loans below 10,000 EUR, our main analysis will focus on
the subsample of loans with amounts exceeding 10,000 EUR.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
11 We cannot observe rejected loan applications. Our study therefore focuses on the determinants of the Bank’s
switching of successful loan applications between loan currencies.
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Figure  2B displays  the  probability  of  the  Bank granting  a  EUR loan  to  a  borrower  who
requested the loan in BGN conditional on its requested loan size, maturity and purpose. The
figure shows that the probability of being switched from a BGN to a EUR loan increases with
the requested loan size and the requested maturity. The figure also shows that the switching
probability is considerably higher for mortgage than for non-mortgage loans.
While Figure 1 and Figure 2 document a high incidence of loan currency switching at the
Bank it is likely that we underestimate the true amount of currency switching. First, we only
observe applications for those loans which were eventually granted. We therefore do not
observe loan applications which were cancelled by the client after the Bank switched the loan
currency. Second, and more important, the loan currency requested by the client may be
strongly influenced by an “anticipation effect”. For example, a firm which wants to apply for
a 5-year mortgage in BGN may be told by the loan officer that such loans are typically given
in EUR and may thus fill out the application form accordingly.
Our empirical analysis is focused on two dependent variables. We first examine the
probability of firm i taking out a loan k at time t to request a foreign currency as opposed to a
domestic currency loan (EUR requested). We then examine the probability that the Bank
switches loan currency, i.e. grants a loan in EUR that was requested in local currency (EUR
granted | BGN requested).
, , 1 , 2 3 4 , ,Pr(  )i k t r s i t k t t i k tEUR requested F L B MD D E E E E H       (1)
, , 1 , 2 3 4 , ,Pr(   |   )i k t r s i t k t t i k tEUR granted BGN requested F L B MD D E E E E H       (2)
We relate both dependent variables to an array of firm characteristics Fi,t, loan
characteristics Lk, as well as indicators of the Bank’s funding structure Bt and monetary
13
conditions Mt when the loan was disbursed. All empirical models include branch and industry
fixed effects ( , )r sD D  to account for variation in the risks of foreign currency borrowing
associated with a firm’s economic activity. Branch fixed effects also control for the
differences in the magnitude of “anticipation effects” on requested loan currency and loan
currency switching between branches if pre-application counseling by loan officers is more
intensive for example at smaller branches.
2.3 Explanatory variables
We  expect  those  firms  to  be  more  likely  to  request  a  EUR  loan  which  have  foreign
currency income, low leverage, and lower distress costs in the case of default. Goswami and
Shrikhande (2001) show that firms may use foreign currency debt as a hedging instrument for
the exchange rate exposure of their revenues (see Brown (2001) and Mian (1996) on foreign
currency hedging). In a model where the uncovered interest rate parity does not hold,12 and
hence the cost of foreign currency debt is lower than the cost of local currency debt, Cowan
(2006) shows that firms will be more likely to choose foreign currency debt the higher the
interest rate differential, the larger their share of income in foreign currency and the lower
their distress costs in case of default. The incentive to take foreign currency loans is weaker
when  the  volatility  of  the  exchange  rate  is  higher,  as  this  increases  the  default  risk  on
unhedged loans. Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2013) argue that firms with low leverage will be
12 See Froot and Thaler (1990) and Isard (2006) for a discussion of the empirical evidence on the uncovered
interest rate parity.
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more likely to borrow in foreign currency while information asymmetries about a firm’s
income structure may increase foreign currency loan demand among unhedged firms.13
The supply of foreign currency loans by banks should be higher to firms with lower
corresponding credit risk, i.e. firms with income in foreign currency, high income to debt
ratios and lower distress costs. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) banks may, however,
ration foreign currency lending in the face of adverse selection. This could imply that banks
supply foreign currency only to clients who are financially transparent and who they know
have foreign currency income. Lenders should also be more willing to offer foreign currency
loans when they have increased access to foreign currency liabilities in the form of wholesale
funds or customer deposits. Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2010) suggest that banks’
supply of foreign currency loans will depend on their access to foreign currency debt through
financial markets or from parent-banks abroad. Similarly, Luca and Petrova (2008) suggest
that increases in banks’ access to foreign currency deposits will lead them to offer more
foreign currency loans.14 Low credibility of domestic monetary policy may make banks
reluctant to lend in local currency, especially at longer maturities (Levy-Yeyati 2006).
As firm-level indicators of benefits and risks associated with foreign currency borrowing
Fi,t we include the variables EUR savings account (1=yes, 0=no), Disposable income (in log
EUR), Leverage (in %), Sole proprietorship (1=yes, 0=no), Assets (in log EUR) and firm Age
(in log years). We further include the Loan number which indicates the number of the loan in
13 They show that in the case when lenders are imperfectly informed about the currency or level of firm revenue
(Berger and Udell 1998, Brown, Jappelli and Pagano 2009, Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta 2008), local
currency earners may be more likely to choose foreign currency loans.
14 For a discussion of deposit dollarization see De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2005).
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a sequence of loans that a borrower takes from the Bank as a proxy for information
asymmetries between the Bank and the borrower.15
With respect to other loan terms we control for the Requested amount and Requested
maturity and whether the loan purpose was to finance real-estate (Mortgage).
In our analysis of the Bank’s loan currency choice (EUR granted) we account for the
possibility that the Bank not only may switch the loan currency, but may also adapt the loan
size and the loan maturity. The variables Amount/Requested amount and Maturity/Requested
maturity capture the ratio of granted to requested loan size and loan maturity respectively.
As indicators of the Bank’s liability structure we employ measures of wholesale and retail
funding in foreign currency: EUR interbank funding and EUR customer funding. Both
indicators are measured in % of total liabilities in the month prior to loan disbursement.
We employ four indicators of monetary conditions which should influence the supply of
foreign currency loans: Spread differential, Inflation volatility, Interest differential and
Forward term spread.16  The Spread differential captures the industry-level difference in the
intermediation spread on EUR versus BGN funds. We first calculate the intermediation
spread for EUR and BGN funds separately using industry-level short-term lending rates
minus  the  household  term  deposit  rates  for  EUR  and  BGN  funds  respectively.  The  spread
differential is then calculated as the difference between the intermediation spread on EUR
funds and that on BGN funds. Inflation volatility is measured as the variance of monthly
changes in the consumer price index (CPI) over the 12 months prior to the quarter in which a
15 The Loan number also  covers  loans  which  are  not  in  our  sample,  i.e.  loans  which  were  disbursed  prior  to
April 2003.
16 In our estimation of foreign currency loan demand we employ time fixed effects in all specifications to
account for monetary conditions.
16
loan is disbursed. The underlying CPI data is taken from the IMF-International Financial
Statistics.
The variables Interest differential and Forward term spread serve as proxies for the
perceived risk of currency depreciation (which may affect credit risk on unhedged foreign
currency loans) and the costs to the Bank of hedging long-term (as opposed to short-term)
foreign currency positions.17 We measure the Interest differential as the quarterly average of
the  interbank  lending  rate  (for  maturities  over  30  days)  in  BGN  minus  that  in  EUR.  The
Forward term spread is the 2-year minus the 3-month rate on over-the-counter BGN/EUR
forward contracts taken from Bloomberg. Given the illiquidity of both the Bulgarian
interbank market and the long-term forward market for BGN/EUR, both of the above
measures provide us only with a rough proxy of changes in exchange rate expectations and
the costs of hedging foreign currency risk during our observation period.
3 Results
3.1 The impact of firm and loan characteristics on loan currency
A. The request for foreign currency loans by firms
Table  4  displays  our  estimation  results  for  firms’  decisions  to  request  foreign  currency
rather than local currency loans (EUR requested). All models presented in the table show
17 Bulgaria introduced a currency board in July 1997 which fixed the exchange rate towards the EUR. This
currency board held throughout our observation period, so that there was almost no actual exchange rate
volatility. However, this by no means implies that firms or banks in Bulgaria were confident that a depreciation
of the BGN would not happen. Indeed, Carlson and Valev (2008) report survey evidence suggesting that in 2004
14 percent of the Bulgarians believed the currency board might collapse with a sharp devaluation within the next
twelve months. Considering a period of five years more than 25 percent of respondents expected the currency
board to collapse with a sharp devaluation. We control for the perceived exchange rate risk with the Interest
differential.
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average marginal effects from logit estimations, include Industry and Branch fixed effects
and control for monetary conditions and the Bank’s funding structure with year-quarter fixed
effects. The panel estimation for repeat clients (column 6) includes firm-level random effects
to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity.18 Standard errors are presented in brackets and
are adjusted for clustering at the industry-branch level in columns (1-5).19
[Insert Table 4 here]
Column (1) of Table 4 presents estimates for the full sample, while column (2) presents
estimates for the subsample of loans exceeding 10,000 EUR. From a qualitative perspective
the two models yield identical results. However, the negligible share of loans requested in
foreign currency among the very small loans (below 10,000 EUR) implies that the estimated
impact of our explanatory variables is small in the full sample (column 1). To gauge the
economic magnitude of our explanatory variables we therefore rely on the estimates for the
subsample of loans exceeding 10,000 EUR (column 2). In this sample the average probability
to request a EUR loan is 18 percent.
The  results  presented  in  columns  (2)  of  Table  4  suggest  that  the  request  for  a  foreign
currency loan is positively related to our indicator of foreign currency revenue: Firms which
have a EUR savings account are 12 percentage points more likely to request foreign currency
than firms that do not have a foreign currency savings account. The negative impact of firm-
level distress costs is also in line with theoretical predictions. We find that Sole
18 We use firm random effects rather than fixed effects so as not to exclude the firms which request the same
currency for each of their loans.
19 As a robustness check we re-estimate all regressions adjusting the standard errors for clustering at the time-
industry-branch level and find our results qualitatively unchanged.
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proprietorships are 2.6 percentage points less likely to demand EUR loans than limited
liability companies. Further, we find that firms with higher Leverage and smaller firms
(lower Assets) are less likely to demand foreign currency loans. Increasing firm leverage by
one standard deviation (0.20) reduces the probability of requesting a foreign currency loan by
0.6 percentage points, while increasing firm size by one standard deviation (440,000 EUR)
from the sample mean (206,000 EUR) raises the probability of requesting a foreign currency
loan by 4.1 percentage points. We find that firms with larger Disposable income are less
likely to request a foreign currency loan. This result may point to the fact that liquidity-
constrained firms are more likely to choose loans with lower interest expense.
Our results do not support the conjecture that opaqueness in the bank-firm relationship
encourages firms to request foreign currency loans. The positive coefficient of Loan number
suggests that more transparent firms (to the Bank) are more likely to request a foreign
currency loan. However, this finding is only of minor economic importance: Our estimates
suggest that taking out a further loan increases the probability of requesting a foreign
currency loan by a mere 0.8 percentage points.
With respect to loan characteristics we find that Requested amount, Requested maturity
and Mortgage loan have a significantly positive impact on the probability to request a foreign
currency loan. An increase in the requested amount from 10,000 EUR to 100,000 EUR raises
this probability by 22.3 percentage points, while increasing the requested loan maturity from
12 to 60 months by 8.5 percentage points. As expected, the coefficient of Mortgage loan is
positive and economically sizeable: Mortgage loans are 9.5 percentage points more likely to
be requested in foreign currency.
The Table 4 results show that the correlation between foreign currency loan demand and
foreign currency income (EUR savings account), disposable income, firm size, loan size and
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loan maturity is consistently found in the subsample of medium and large loans (column 3),
non-mortgage loans (column 4) as well as mortgage loans (column 5). In line with the picture
displayed in Figure 2A the economic magnitude of the requested loan size and maturity is
larger for mortgage loans than for non-mortgage loans. The panel estimates in column (6) for
our subsample of repeat clients confirm that our main findings are not driven by unobserved
heterogeneity across firms.
In  all  models  presented  in  Table  4  we  include  a  full  set  of Industry and Branch fixed
effects. For brevity the coefficients of these industry and branch intercepts are not presented
in the table, but discussed here. Our Industry dummies suggest that firms operating in
industries that are likely to have foreign currency earnings such as transport, tourism, trade
and manufacturing display a larger likelihood to request EUR loans than borrowers from
other industries like services or agriculture (the base category). The branch dummies suggest
that firms located in the major economic and touristic hubs of the country, e.g. the capital
Sofia, the Danube port Ruse or the Black Sea tourist destinations, are more likely to request
EUR loans than firms in other areas.
B. The switching of loans from local to foreign currency by banks
We observe the Bank’s currency decision both for those loans which were requested in
foreign currency (EUR) and for those which were requested in local currency (BGN). We can
therefore examine the Bank’s currency choice conditional on the firms’ requested currency.
As shown in Figure 1, a substantial share of loans which firms request in BGN are switched
by the Bank to EUR, while few loans requested in EUR are switched to BGN. Our attention
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in  Table  5  is  therefore  focused  on  those  loans  which  are  requested  in  BGN  to  identify  the
drivers behind the Bank’s switching of loans to foreign currency (EUR).20
Table 5 again presents six models based on our full sample of firms (column 1), loans
exceeding 10,000 EUR (column 2), loans exceeding 50,000 EUR (column 3), non-mortgage
loans (column 4), mortgage loans (column 5) and loans to repeat clients (column 6). In all
models we control for the time-varying funding structure of the Bank and monetary
conditions with year-quarter fixed effects. In addition we include a full set of Industry and
Branch fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in brackets and for the cross-sectional
regressions are again adjusted for clustering at the branch-region level.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results presented in Table 5 suggest that the Bank’s propensity to switch loans from
local currency to foreign currency is negatively related to observable indicators of credit risk.
In  particular,  the  Bank  is  more  likely  to  grant  a  EUR  loan  to  firms  which  are  not  a Sole
proprietorship and  to  firms  which  are  larger  (Assets). Referring to the estimates for loans
exceeding 10,000 EUR (column 2), we find that Sole proprietorships are 1.1 percentage
points less likely to be switched to a foreign currency loan than limited liability firms.
Moreover, a one standard-deviation increase in firm Assets from the sample mean increases
the probability of being switched to a foreign currency loan by 1 percentage points. Neither
20 In unreported regressions we examine the Bank’s currency choice for those firms which request a loan in
EUR but are granted one in BGN. Confirming our results from the main analysis, we find that the Bank is more
likely to grant a BGN loan to those clients that display a higher credit risk (fewer Assets or  a Sole
proprietorship) and want short-term (Requested maturity) or other than Mortgage loans.
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of these effects is very sizeable given that the average propensity of the Bank to switch loans
from local to foreign currency (in the sample of loans exceeding 10,000 EUR) is 10 percent.
The Requested amount, the Requested maturity and  the  purpose  of  the  loan  (Mortgage
loan) strongly affect the Bank’s currency decision. An increase in the requested amount from
10,000 to 100,000 EUR raises the probability of the Bank switching a loan requested in BGN
to EUR by 3.9 percentage points. An increase in the requested loan maturity from 12 to 60
months raises this probability by 1.9 percentage points. The probability that a Mortgage loan
requested in local currency is switched to foreign currency is 6.5 percentage points higher
than for a non-mortgage loan.
The column (3-5) estimates in Table 5 confirm that the correlation between loan currency
switching and firm ownership, firm size, requested loan size and requested loan maturity is
again robust across the subsample of large and medium loans (> 50,000 EUR), non-mortgage
loans and mortgage loans. Moreover, the panel estimates for repeat clients in column (6)
confirm that these findings are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. in credit risk)
across firms.
The Table 5 estimates show that the switching of the loan currency by the Bank is strongly
correlated with changes in loan amount and loan maturity. The significantly positive
estimates for Amount/Requested amount and Maturity/Requested maturity show  that  firms
which receive larger and longer-term loans relative to their requests are also more likely to
experience a currency switch from BGN to EUR. There are (at least) three potential drivers of
the simultaneous changes in loan currency, loan amount, and loan maturity by the Bank.
First, the loan terms may be changed on the basis of a mis-assessment of their
creditworthiness by loan applicants: If the Bank judges the creditworthiness of an applicant to
be higher (lower) than the applicant, the Bank may be more (less) willing to extend larger,
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longer-term and foreign currency loans than the applicant anticipated. However, the finding
that the coefficients for Amount/Requested amount and Maturity/Requested maturity are at
least as large in our panel estimates (column 6) as they are in our cross-sectional estimates
casts doubt on the conjecture that the mis-assessment of their creditworthiness by applicants
is mainly responsible for the Bank’s changes in loan terms.
Second, the Bank’s asset-liability management strategy (e.g. on-balance-sheet hedging of
foreign currency and interest rate risk) may induce the credit department to “push” long-term
and foreign currency loans to clients. The simultaneous increase in loan amount may result as
a consequence of better affordability of long-term and (lower-cost) foreign currency loans.
Third, the Bank’s hedging of financial risk (currency, interest rate, liquidity or credit risk)
through off-balance sheet activities (securitization, loan sales) may only be feasible for loans
with a specific currency (EUR), maturity and size. Thus, the Bank may adapt loans’ currency,
amount and maturity to increase their marketability. In the following two sections we
examine to what extent the Bank’s switching of loan currency may be explained by on-
balance sheet asset-liability management or off-balance sheet activities.
3.2 Bank funding and loan currency switching
In this section we relate the propensity of the Bank to switch loans from BGN to EUR to
the Bank’s share of wholesale and customer funding in foreign currency (EUR interbank
funding, EUR customer funding). Figure 3 displays the Bank’s funding in EUR by quarter
over  our  observation  period  as  well  as  the  share  of  loans  (with  amount  >  10,000  EUR)
switched  from  BGN  to  EUR.  The  share  of EUR interbank funding in the Bank’s total
liabilities varies from 12% (2007:Q3) to 33% (2006:Q1), while the share of EUR customer
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funding varies from 4% (2003:Q2) to 24% (2007:Q3). There is no apparent correlation
between the share of loans switched from BGN to EUR and the wholesale funding of the
Bank in EUR over our entire observation period. In the first half of our observation period
there is also no correlation between the customer funding of the Bank in EUR and loan
currency switching. From 2006:Q2 onwards we do however see a faster growth of EUR
customer funding which coincides with a sharp increase in EUR granted.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
In Table 6 we report our regression results for the impact of bank funding on the Bank’s
decision to grant foreign currency loans. We re-estimate the regressions from columns (2, 4,
5, 6) in Table 5 replacing the year-quarter fixed effects with our bank funding variables and
controls for monetary conditions (Spread differential, Inflation volatility, Interest differential,
Forward term spread). For brevity, we do not report the estimation results for our firm-level
and loan-level explanatory variables in the table. The observation period for this analysis
starts in June 2004 because data for our control variable Forward term spread is only
available from then onwards.
The results presented in Table 6 suggest that the Bank is more likely to switch loans from
BGN to EUR when its  customer liabilities in foreign currency (EUR customer funding) are
higher, but not when its wholesale funding in EUR is higher. The positive and significant
estimate reported in column (1) suggests that going from the lowest to the highest share of
EUR customer funding increases the likelihood that the Bank switches the loan currency from
BGN  to  EUR  by  18  percentage  points.  By  contrast,  the  reported  coefficient  for EUR
interbank funding is insignificant in both statistical and economic terms. These results
24
confirm the findings of Brown and De Haas (2012) who suggest that the “dollarization” of
customer deposits is a strong driver of foreign currency lending in the region.
The column (2-3) estimates show that the correlation between foreign currency customer
funding and the switching of loan currency is stronger for mortgage loans than for non-
mortgage loans. Thus while asset-liability management considerations may induce the Bank
to “push” some clients towards foreign currency loans, it seems that the Bank especially
pushes those clients who pose a lower credit risk for the Bank.
[Insert Table 6 here]
With respect to our macroeconomic control variables we find mixed results. The Bank’s
decision to switch a loan from BGN to EUR is not systematically related to the differences in
the intermediation spread it can earn on the two currencies (Spread differential).  We find a
positive correlation between Inflation volatility and loan currency switching for mortgage
loans (column 3) as well as in our panel estimates (column 4), but not for non-mortgage loans
(column 2) or our full sample (column 1). This result is in line with the reasoning in Ize and
Levy-Yeyati (2003) that banks may prefer to make foreign currency loans, especially for
longer maturities (mortgages) in countries where the monetary authority has failed to
establish a reputation for pursuing price stability.
Our estimates for Interest differential suggest that depreciation expectations are positively
correlated with the switching of loans to foreign currency, but only for non-mortgage loans.
This result is incompatible with a view that the Bank reduces its exchange rate induced credit
risk exposure in times of greater exchange rate uncertainty. Our estimates for Term spread
differential in columns (2-3) suggest that the costs of off-balance-sheet hedging of (long-
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term) foreign currency positions are negatively correlated with the currency switching of non-
mortgage loans but not of mortgage loans. This result provides some support for the
conjecture that the on-balance sheet hedging of short-term vs. long-term foreign currency
positions is  likely to be affected by the relative cost  of short-term vs.  long-term off-balance
sheet hedging.
The results displayed in Table 6 suggest that foreign currency lending by the Bank is to a
significant extent driven by the eagerness of the Bank to match the currency composition of
its assets with that of its (customer) liabilities. Note that in contrast to the findings of
aggregate studies (e.g. Luca and Petrova 2008), the positive correlation between foreign
currency customer funding and foreign currency lending observed above cannot be driven by
reverse causality. We examine the probability of the Bank to grant loans in foreign currency,
which were requested in local currency. Thus, by construction we are examining a sample of
loans in which there is no confounding demand for foreign currency.21 The panel estimates
reported for repeat clients in column (4) also rule out that the observed correlation between
customer funding and loan currency switching is driven by unobserved heterogeneity of
clients applying for loans at different times during our observation period.
However, the observed correlation between customer funding and the switching of loan
currency may be driven by omitted economic developments. As depicted in Figure 3 there is
a steady increase in the foreign currency customer funding of our Bank, while the share of
loans switched from local to foreign currency experiences a sharp increase in 2006 and 2007.
Thus, the observed correlation between EUR customer funding and currency switching by the
21 In unreported robustness tests we replicate the model presented in column (1) of Table 6 with EUR requested
as the dependent variable. The results of that robustness test suggest that the demand for foreign currency loans
by firms in our sample is unrelated to the funding structure of the Bank in any case.
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Bank in Table 6 may be driven by unobserved changes in economic conditions in 2006 and
2007. In particular, the negotiations over Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union (which
were finalized in October 2006) may have spurred foreign currency lending by our Bank. In
the following section we examine the impact of regulatory changes and capital market
imperfections which are exogenous to the Bank’s lending activities in order to further
identify supply-side drivers of loan currency choice.
3.3 Securitization and loan currency choice
Bulgaria, like many other Central and Eastern European transition countries, experienced a
massive credit boom starting in the early 2000s.22 In the beginning of 2005, the Bulgarian
National Bank (BNB) decided to take macroprudential regulatory steps to slow credit growth
because of the fear that the credit boom could threaten the stability of the banking system and
exacerbate macroeconomic volatility. Increased reserve requirements were introduced in
April 2005 to penalize banks whose lending portfolio expansions exceeded certain thresholds
(BNB 2005). To circumvent these increased reserve requirements, several banks sold loans
off their balance sheets (e.g. to their foreign parent banks) or securitized part of their loan
portfolio.
The Bank in our sample securitized a substantial share of its loan portfolio starting from
April 2006. In the following set of exercises we exploit the differential ability of the Bank to
securitize  EUR and BGN loans  to  identify  the  supply-side  drivers  of  loan  currency  choice.
Importantly, while the securitization arrangement of our Bank itself may be endogenous,
22 Part  of  this  increase  may  be  attributed  to  a  catching-up  process  to  EU  levels  and  a  financial  deepening
consistent with economic fundamentals (e.g. Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar 2003, Faure 2007).
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capital market imperfections imply that securitization is only possible for loans denominated
in EUR. Moreover, the securitization arrangement of our Bank also specified that loans with
amounts above 350,000 EUR or maturities longer than 7 years were not eligible for
securitization. Thus securitization can be seen as an exogenous supply-side driver of foreign
currency lending at least for loans of eligible size and maturity.
Figure 4 provides first suggestive evidence that the securitization of foreign currency loans
from  2006  onwards  did  lead  to  a  strong  supply  effect.  The  share  of  loans  which  were
switched by the Bank to EUR (when the firm requested BGN) increased considerably after
the securitization arrangement started in the second quarter of 2006. By contrast the share of
loans requested in EUR by borrowers decreased steadily during 2006 and 2007.23 Note that
the introduction of macroprudential regulations per se in 2005:Q2 had no corresponding
effect on loan currency supply.  In the following we will  treat  this change in regulation as a
placebo test to check the robustness of our findings.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Table 7 examines the impact of securitization on the probability that the Bank switches
loans requested in local currency to foreign currency. To rule out that the effects of the
securitization are confounded with the effects of economic and political developments, we
compare the impact of the securitization on the currency of loans which were eligible and
non-eligible for securitization.24 In Table 7 we define eligibility based on both the requested
23 Throughout this section we focus on the subsample of loans with loan amounts exceeding 10,000 EUR.
24 As mentioned above, during 2006 the negotiations over accession by Bulgaria to the European Union were
completed. The anticipation of EU accession per January 1st, 2007, may have reduced the perceived risk
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and granted loan terms. We thus compare loans for which (ex-ante) the bank had to change
only  the  loan  currency  to  make  them  eligible  for  securitization  to  loans  for  which  even  a
change in the currency would not have been sufficient (ex-post) to make them eligible for
securitization.
Panel A examines the sample of loans requested in local currency during the three quarters
before and after the start of the securitization arrangement. The column (1) results show that
for the group of eligible loans the likelihood that the Bank switches a loan from BGN to EUR
increases by 3 percentage points after the start of the securitization deal. By contrast, column
2 shows that for non-eligible loans the switching likelihood actually decreases (albeit not
significantly) after the start of the securitization deal. The significant difference-in-difference
estimate confirms that the change in the switching likelihood is 15 percentage points higher
for the eligible than for the non-eligible loans. Panel B confirms these findings studying the
six quarters before and after the start of the securitization arrangement.
The  analysis  in  Table  7,  Panel  C  provides  a  placebo  test  focusing  on  the  three  quarters
before and after the introduction of the macroprudential regulations. Since these regulations
introduced increased reserve requirements for all loans independent of their currency, we do
not expect to find any effect on the likelihood to switch the loan currency from BGN to EUR
due to this event. The results in Panel C indeed show that the introduction of the
macroprudential regulations did not lead to any increase in the switching likelihood, neither
for loans eligible nor non-eligible for securitization. These results lend further credibility to
the securitization arrangement being an exogenous driver of currency switching.
associated with foreign currency loans. If many first-time borrowers during this period underestimated their
eligibility for foreign currency loans, we would also observe an increase in switching of loans from local to
foreign currency, independent of securitization.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
The results in Table 7 suggest that – for those loans which only need a currency switch to
make them eligible for securitization – the Bank is indeed more likely to switch the currency.
If this is the case, then we would also expect that the Bank undertakes a simultaneous
adaption of loan currency, loan amount and loan maturity for those loans which are otherwise
not eligible for securitization. To be precise, we should see that after the beginning of the
securitization deal the Bank is more likely to reduce the amount and maturity of loans so that
they adhere to the thresholds of 350,000 EUR and 7 years respectively. In addition, we expect
that if the Bank reduces the maturity or amount of a loan below these thresholds, then the
Bank should also be more likely to switch the currency to EUR.
Table 8 displays our analysis of the simultaneous adaptation of loan currency, loan amount
and loan maturity by the Bank in order to make loans eligible for securitization. In this table
we focus on those loans which were requested in local currency, and which also exceed the
eligibility thresholds for securitization with respect to requested loan amount (> EUR
350,000) or requested loan maturity (> 7 years). The table first reports the share of these
loans for which the Bank adapted the loan amount and/or loan maturity so that both eligibility
criteria are met. The table then reports the share of loan currency switches for those loans
which are eligible based on granted loan amount and granted loan maturity versus those loans
which are not eligible. As in Table 7 we report findings for event windows of +/- 3 quarters
(Panel A) and +/- 6 quarters (Panel B) around the beginning of the securitization deal as well
as  a  placebo  test  based  on  an  event  window of   +/-  3  quarters  around the  beginning  of  the
macroprudential regulations (Panel C).
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The results displayed in Table 8 show that the Bank was much more likely to adapt the
loan  amount  and/or  maturity  of  loans  to  make  them  eligible  for  securitization  after  the
beginning  of  the  securitization  deal.  The  Panel  A  results  show  that  the  likelihood  of  a
reduction of the loan amount and/or loan maturity below the eligibility thresholds increases
by 23 percentage points in the 3 quarters after the deal began compared to the three quarters
prior to the deal. This finding is confirmed in Panel B for a wider event window, but is not
found in the placebo test in Panel C.
The Table 8 results provide strong evidence for a simultaneous adaptation of loan currency
with loan amount and maturity to meet the eligibility criteria for securitization. The Panel A
results show that among the loans which experience a reduction in loan amount and/or
maturity below the eligibility thresholds the frequency of currency switches increases by 29
percentage points after the beginning of the securitization deal. By contrast among those
loans which are not made eligible in terms of amount and maturity the frequency of currency
switches drops by (an insignificant) 12 percentage points. The difference-in-difference effect
thus suggests that securitization leads to a 41 percentage higher increase in currency switches
for loans which were simultaneously made eligible in terms of amount and/or maturity.
Again these findings are confirmed in Panel B for a broader event window, but not confirmed
in the placebo test in Panel C.
In Table 9 we provide a multivariate analysis of the impact of the securitization
arrangement on the Bank’s propensity to switch loan currency. Replicating model (2) from
Table 5 we include (but do not report) a full set of firm-level and loan-level explanatory
variables as well as industry and branch fixed effects. In addition we include the dummy
variables Securitization (1=loan was disbursed after April 1st 2006, 0= loan disbursed prior to
April 1st 2006) and Eligible and the interaction term between the two. Our main interest lies
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in the interaction term Securitization*Eligible: If this interaction term is significantly
positive, it identifies the securitization arrangement as a supply-side driver of foreign
currency lending. In Panel A we restrict our analysis (as in Table 7) to loans that are eligible
vs. not eligible for securitization based on requested and granted loan amount and maturity.
In  Panel  B  we  consider  only  loans  which  are  not  eligible  based  on  requested  loan  amount
and/or maturity.
[Insert Table 9 here]
The results presented in Table 9 confirm that the securitization arrangement of the Bank
induced more switching of loans from local to foreign currency. In Panel A, the estimated
coefficients of the interaction terms Securitization*Eligible in  columns  (1-2)  confirm  that
after the securitization deal commenced the likelihood of a loan currency switch from BGN
to EUR for eligible loans increased by 14 to 15 percentage points more than for non-eligible
loans. Confirming our univariate results, columns (1-2) in Panel B show that for those loans
that are not eligible based on their requested loan amount and/or maturity the differential
increase  in  the  likelihood  of  a  currency  switch  from  BGN  to  EUR  (between  40  and  43
percentage points) after the start of the securitization arrangement is considerably larger.
In  columns  (3-6)  of  Panel  A  and  B  we  replicate  our  analysis  in  column  (1)  for  two
different sample splits: mortgage vs. non-mortgage loans and sole proprietorships vs. non-
sole proprietorships. We conduct these sample splits in order to assess whether the additional
foreign currency loans extended by the Bank after the commencement of the securitization
arrangement exposed the Bank to more credit risk. In both Panel A and B the subsample
estimates in columns (3-6) suggest that the Bank is more likely to switch clients from local
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currency to foreign currency if they imply lower credit risk: Comparing the coefficients for
the interaction terms Securitization*Eligible in columns (5-6) of Panel A and Panel B shows
that the impact on sole proprietorships is much lower than on non-sole proprietorships. When
comparing the impact of the securitization deal on currency switching for mortgage loans vs.
non-mortgage loans in Panel A we find that the effect is much stronger for mortgage loans.25
Overall our findings suggest that while the securitization arrangement did lead the Bank to
push more clients to foreign currency loans, there is no evidence that this is associated with
laxer lending standards.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the currency denomination of loans extended to small firms by
one  retail  bank  in  Bulgaria.  Our  analysis  is  based  on  credit  file  data  for  99,490  loans  to
57,464 firms over the period 2003-2007. In contrast to existing studies, we observe not only
the actual currency denomination of the loan extended, but also the loan currency that was
requested by the firms in their loan application. We are therefore able to study to what extent
the currency denomination is driven by supply-side factors such as foreign currency funding
and securitization. Our results suggest that foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe is at
least partly supply-driven, with the bank hesitant to lend long-term in local currency and
eager to match the currency structure of its assets and liabilities and to make use of
securitization activities.
25 We are unable to retrieve difference-in-difference estimates for the non-mortgage loans because there are no
non-eligible loans in the period before the start of the securitization arrangement in this subsample.
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Our results have implications for policy makers throughout Eastern Europe who have
recently taken measures to discourage foreign currency borrowing in the retail sector
(Rosenberg and Tirpak 2009). In Hungary, Poland and Latvia, for example, banks are now
forced to disclose the exchange rate risks involved in foreign currency borrowing and have
had to tighten eligibility criteria for such loans. In Romania and Croatia, on the other hand,
supervisory authorities have imposed stronger provisioning requirements on foreign currency
compared to local currency loans. As we find that foreign currency borrowing in Emerging
Europe seems to a non-negligible part be driven by supply factors, measures that address only
the demand side may not be enough to curb foreign currency borrowing.
Our results suggest that wholesale foreign currency funding of banks in Eastern Europe
may not be the key driver of foreign currency lending in the region. By contrast we find that
foreign currency retail deposits have a strong impact on foreign currency lending. This
finding is in line with the cross-country evidence provided by Brown and De Haas (2012) and
suggests that recent proposals to foster local currency wholesale funding in Eastern Europe
may not be sufficient to reduce foreign currency lending.26 Instead, credible macroeconomic
policies which encourage customers to save in local currency may be more promising. A
credible macroeconomic environment would also make banks less hesitant to extend large
and long-term loans in local currency.
Finally, we document that the securitization activities of the bank from 2006 onwards did
lead to a supply effect on loan terms. The share of loans eligible for securitization which were
switched by the bank to foreign currency increased considerably while no such effect is
observed for non-eligible loans. However, our results provide no conclusive evidence that the
26 The President of the EBRD, Thomas Mirow, highlighted this proposal in a Speech on May 13 at the 2010
Joint Conference of the IIF and EBRD on Financial Systems in Emerging Europe in Zagreb.
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increase in foreign currency lending induced by securitization also led the bank to take on
increased credit risk.
35
References
Ai, Chunrong, and Edward C. Norton. (2003). “Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit
Models.” Economics Letters 80, 123-129.
Allayannis, George, Gregory W. Brown, and Leora F. Klapper. (2003). “Capital Structure
and Financial Risk: Evidence from Foreign Debt Use in East Asia.” Journal of Finance 58,
2667-2709.
Arteta,  Carlos  O.  (2005).  “Exchange  Rate  Regimes  and  Financial  Dollarization:  Does
Flexibility Reduce Bank Currency Mismatches?” Berkeley Electronic Journals in
Macroeconomics, Topics in Macroeconomics 5, No. 1, Article 10.
Barajas,  Adolfo,  and  R.  Armando Morales.  (2003).  “Dollarization  of  Liabilities:  Beyond
the Usual Suspects.” International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 03/11.
Basso, Henrique S., Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, and Marius Jurgilas. (2010). “Financial
Dollarization: The Role of Foreign-Owned Banks and Interest Rates.” Journal of Banking
and Finance 35, 794-806.
Beckmann,  Elisabeth,  Thomas  Scheiber,  and  Helmut  Stix.  (2011).  “How  the  Crisis
Affected Foreign Currency Borrowing in CESEE: Microeconomic Evidence and Policy
Implications.” OeNB Focus on European Economic Integration Q1/11, 25-43.
Beer, Christian, Steven Ongena, and Marcel Peter. (2010). “Borrowing in Foreign
Currency: Austrian Households as Carry Traders.” Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 2198-
2211.
Benmelech, Efraim, Jennifer Dlugosz, and Victoria Ivashina. (2012). “Securitization
without Adverse Selection: The Case of CLOs.” Journal of Financial Economics 106, 91-113.
36
Benavente,  José  M.,  Christian  A.  Johnson,  and  Felipe  G.  Morande.  (2003).  “Debt
Composition and Balance Sheet Effects of Exchange Rate Depreciations: A Firm-Level
Analysis for Chile.” Emerging Markets Review 4, 397-416.
Berger, Allen N., and Gregory F. Udell. (1998). “The Economics of Small Business
Finance:  the  Roles  of  Private  Equity  and  Debt  Markets  in  the  Financial  Growth  Cycle.”
Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 613-673.
Berlin, Mitchell and Loretta J. Mester. (1999). “Deposits and Relationship Lending.”
Review of Financial Studies 12, 579-607.
BNB. (2005). “Bulgarian National Bank Report January – June 2005.” Bulgarian National
Bank, Sofia.
Brown, Gregory W. (2001). “Managing Foreign Exchange Risk with Derivatives.” Journal
of Financial Economics 60, 401-448.
Brown,  Martin,  Tullio  Jappelli,  and  Marco  Pagano.  (2009).  “Information  Sharing  and
Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries.” Journal of Financial Intermediation
18, 151-172.
Brown,  Martin,  and  Ralph  De  Haas.  (2012).  “Foreign  Banks  and  Foreign  Currency
Lending in Emerging Europe.” Economic Policy 27, 57-98.
Brown, Martin, and Philip R. Lane. (2011). “Debt Overhang in Emerging Europe?” World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5784.
Brown, Martin, Steven Ongena, and Pinar Yesin. (2011). “Foreign Currency Borrowing
by Small Firms in the Transition Economies.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 20, 285-
302.
Brown, Martin, Steven Ongena, and Pinar Yesin. (2013). “Information Asymmetry and
Foreign Currency Borrowing by Firms.” Comparative Economic Studies, forthcoming.
37
Carlson, John A., and Naven Valev. (2008). “Fixed Exchange Rate Credibility with
Heterogeneous Expectations.” Journal of Macroeconomics 30, 1712-1722.
Cottarelli, Carlo, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar. (2005). “Early
Birds, Late Risers, and Sleeping Beauties: Bank Credit Growth to the Private Sector in
Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans.” Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 83-104.
Cowan, Kevin. (2006). “Firm Level Determinants of Dollar Debt?” Central Bank of Chile,
Working Paper.
Cowan, Kevin, Erwin Hansen, and Luis O. Herrera. (2005). “Currency Mismatches,
Balance Sheet Effects and Hedging in Chilean Nonfinancial Corporations.” Central Bank of
Chile, Working Paper.
De  Nicolo,  Gianni,  Patrick  Honohan,  and  Alain  Ize.  (2005).  “Dollarization  of  Bank
Deposits: Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 1697-1727.
Detragiache, Enrica, Thierry Tressel, and Poonam Gupta. (2008). “Foreign Banks in Poor
Countries: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Finance 63, 2123-2160.
ECB.  (2007).  “Review  of  the  International  Role  of  the  Euro.”  European  Central  Bank,
Frankfurt a. M.
ECB. (2010). “Financial Stability Review, June 2010. ” European Central Bank, Frankfurt
a. M.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Ricardo Hausmann. (1999). “Exchange Rates and Financial
Fragility.” NBER Working Paper 7418.
Faure, François. (2007). “Is the Rapid Growth of Lending in Central and Eastern Europe a
Cause for Concern?” BNP Paribas.
Fidrmuc, Jarko, Mariya Hake, and Helmut Stix. (2013). “Households’ Foreign Currency
Borrowing in Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 1880-1897.
38
Froot, Kenneth A., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein. (1993). “Risk Management:
Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies.” Journal of Finance 48, 1629-
1658.
Froot, Kenneth A., and Richard H. Thaler. (1990). “Anomalies: Foreign Exchange.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, 179-192.
Gelos,  Gaston  R.  (2003).  “Foreign  Currency  Debt  in  Emerging  Markets:  Firm-Level
Evidence from Mexico.” Economics Letters 78, 323–327.
Goswami, Gautam, and Milind M. Shrikhande. (2001). “Economic Exposure and Debt
Financing Choice.” Journal of Multinational Financial Management 11, 39-58.
Hausmann, Ricardo, and Ugo Panizza. (2003). “On the Determinants of Original Sin: An
Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International Money and Finance 22, 957-990.
Isard, Peter. (2006). “Uncovered Interest Parity.” International Monetary Fund, Working
Paper.
Ivashina, Victoria, and David S. Scharfstein. (2010). “Bank Lending During the Financial
Crisis of 2008.” Journal of Financial Economics 97, 319-338.
Ize, Alain, and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati. (2003). “Financial Dollarization.” Journal of
International Economics 59, 323-347.
Kara, Alper, David Marqués-Ibáñez, and Steven Ongena. (2011). “Securitization and
Lending Standards - Evidence from the Wholesale Loan Market.” European Central Bank
Working Paper 1362.
Kedia, Simi, and Abon Mozumdar. (2003). “Foreign Currency-Denominated Debt: An
Empirical Examination.” Journal of Business 76, 521-546.
Keloharju,  Matti,  and  Mervi  Niskanen.  (2001).  “Why Do Firms  Raise  Foreign  Currency
Denominated Debt?” European Financial Management 7, 481-496.
39
Keys, Benjamin J., Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. (2012). “Lender Screening and Role of
Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets.” Review of Financial
Studies 25, 2071-2108.
Keys, Benjamin J., Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. (2010). “Did
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening: Evidence from Subprime Loans.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 125, 307-362.
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo. (2006). “Financial Dollarization: Evaluating the Consequences.”
Economic Policy 21, 61-118.
Loutskina, Elena. (2011). “The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding
Management.” Journal of Financial Economics 100, 663-684.
Loutskina, Elena and Philip E. Strahan. (2009). “Securitization and the Declining Impact
of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Acceptance Rates.” Journal of
Finance 64, 861-889.
Luca, Alina, and Iva Petrova. (2008). “What drives Credit Dollarization in Transition
Economies?” Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 858-869.
Maddaloni, Angela, and José-Luis Peydró. (2011). “Bank Risk-taking, Securitization,
Supervision, and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from Euro-area and US Lending Standards.”
Review of Financial Studies 24, 2121-2165.
Martinez, Lorenza, and Alejandro Werner. (2002). “The Exchange Rate Regime and the
Currency Composition of Corporate Debt: The Mexican Experience.” Journal of
Development Economics 69, 315-334.
Mian, Shehzad L. (1996). “Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy.” Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 31, 419-439.
40
Ranciere, Romain, Aaron Tornell, and Athanasios Vamvakidis. (2010). “Currency
Mismatch, Systemic Risk and Growth in Emerging Europe.” Economic Policy 25, 597-658.
Rosenberg, Christoph B., and Marcel Tirpak. (2009). “Determinants of Foreign Currency
Borrowing in the New Member States of the EU.” Czech Journal of Economics and Finance
59, 216-228.
Sorsa, Piritta, Bas B. Bakker, Christoph Duenwald, Andrea M. Maechler, and Andrew
Tiffin. (2007). “Vulnerabilities in Emerging Southeastern Europe – How Much Cause for
Concern?” International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 07/236.
Granted currency 94,114 BGN EUR 5,376
Requested currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
93,893 221 1,715 3,661
(99.8%) (0.2%) (31.9%) (68.1%)
Granted currency 491 BGN EUR 271
Requested currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
486 4 61 210
(99.0%) (0.8%) (22.5%) (77.5%)
Number of loans disbursed (Total= 99,490)
Volume of loans disbursed in Mio EUR (Total= 762)
Figure 1. Requested vs. granted loan currency
Note: This figure displays the share of requested and granted loan currencies in number of
loans and volume of loans disbursed.
Figure 2. Requested and granted currency by loan size and maturity
Figure 2A. Share of loans requested in EUR
Figure 2B. Probability of being granted EUR after having requested BGN
Notes: This figure displays the share of Mortgage loans and Non-mortgage loans ,
respectively, that is requested in EUR (Figure 2A) and that is granted in EUR after being
requested in BGN (Figure 2B) by requested loan size and loan maturity.
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Figure 3. EUR funding and loan currency switches by quarter
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2004:Q3. The vertical lines indicate the introduction of macroprudential regulations
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Variable Definition Unit Source
Dependent variables
EUR requested Firm requested EUR loan (1=yes, 0=no) 1/0 Bank
EUR granted Bank granted EUR loan (1=yes, 0=no) 1/0 Bank
Firm characteristics (at loan disbursement date)
EUR savings  account Firm holds EUR savings or term account (1=yes, 0=no) 1/0 Bank
Disposable income Total disposable income per month log EUR Bank
Leverage Total debt as share of total assets of firm % Bank
Sole proprietorship Firm is sole proprietorship  (1=yes, 0=no) 1/0 Bank
Loan number The number of a loan in the sequence of loans a borrower takes out (1 to 9) integer 1-9 Bank
Assets Total assets of firm log EUR Bank
Age Firm age log years Bank
Industry Industry dummies which equal one if firm belongs to one of the following sectors:
Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, Transport, Tourism, Other services. Baseline industry
is Agriculture
1/0 Bank
Loan characteristics
Requested amount Requested loan amount log EUR Bank
Amount/Requested amount Ratio of granted loan amount to requested loan amount ratio Bank
Requested maturity Requested loan maturity log months Bank
Maturity/Requested maturity Ratio of granted loan maturity to requested loan maturity ratio Bank
Mortgage loan Loan is a mortgage loan (1=yes, 0=no) 1/0 Bank
Branch Branch dummies which equal one for the branch in which the loan was granted 1/0 Bank
Eligible (Granted and requested) Loan is eligible for securitization based on its requested and granted amount (both up to
350,000 EUR) and its requested and granted maturity (both up to 7 years)
1/0 Bank
Eligible (Granted, not requested) Loan is eligible for securitization based on its granted amount (up to 350,000 EUR) and
granted maturity (up to 7 years) but not based on its requested amount and/or maturity
1/0 Bank
Bank funding (at end of month prior to loan disbursement)
EUR interbank funding EUR interbank funding (credit lines) as share of the bank's total liabilities % Bank
EUR customer funding EUR customer funding (deposits) as share of the bank's total liabilities % Bank
Macroeconomic conditions (in month or quarter of loan disbursement)
Spread differential Intermediation spread (short-term lending rate minus household deposit rate) in EUR minus
spread in BGN
% BNB
Inflation volatility Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index over 12 months prior to
beginning of the quarter in which the loan is disbursed
% IFS
Interest differential Quarterly average of the interbank lending rate (for maturities over 30 days) in BGN minus
interbank lending rate (for maturities over 30 days) in EUR
% BNB
Forward term spread 2-year forward rate BGN to EUR minus 3-month forward rate BGN to EUR (available from
June 2004 onwards)
1/100 BGN
per EUR
Bloomberg
Table 1. Variable definitions and data sources
N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
EUR requested 99,490 0.04 0.19 0 1
EUR granted 99,490 0.05 0.23 0 1
Firm characteristics
EUR savings account 99,490 0.01 0.09 0 1
Disposable income 99,490 842 5,906 0 1,154,455
Leverage 99,490 0.15 0.19 0 1
Sole proprietorship 99,490 0.90 0.30 0 1
Loan number 99,490 1.91 1.30 1 9
Assets 99,490 55,929 203,899 2 12,835,983
Age 99,490 8.48 5.48 0 107
Loan characteristics
Requested amount 99,490 8,149 24,266 61 1,000,000
Amount/Requested amount 99,490 0.95 0.18 0.50 2
Requested maturity 99,490 31 20 1 240
Maturity/Requested maturity 99,490 0.97 0.70 0.02 60
Mortgage loan 99,490 0.09 0.29 0 1
Bank funding
EUR interbank funding 54 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.33
EUR customer funding 54 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.24
Macroeconomic conditions
Spread differential 54 -0.36 0.95 -2.40 2.08
Inflation volatility 54 0.98 0.35 0.45 1.71
Interest differential 54 1.32 0.62 0.48 2.40
Forward term spread 40 1.86 1.36 0.09 4.67
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for all variables. See Table 1 for definitions and sources of the
variables. For all log-transformed variables the statistics are calculated by using the original values.
Year Full sample
Amount >
10,000 EUR
Amount >
50,000 EUR Mortgage loans Repeat clients
2003 10,383 1,235 202 1,649 7,300
2004 17,859 2,137 353 2,534 13,750
2005 22,282 3,872 503 2,220 17,060
2006 26,376 5,028 521 2,036 17,427
2007 22,590 5,388 422 ,976 10,108
Total 99,490 17,660 2,001 9,415 65,645
Year Full sample
Amount >
10,000 EUR
Amount >
50,000 EUR Mortgage loans Repeat clients
2003 66 45 24 37 47
2004 119 78 43 69 93
2005 180 121 62 90 137
2006 205 131 60 89 147
2007 192 133 49 57 102
Total 762 509 238 343 525
Year Full sample
Amount >
10,000 EUR
Amount >
50,000 EUR Mortgage loans Repeat clients
2003 43.7 61.9 78.2 59.4 44.4
2004 42.2 61.7 79.4 62.9 41.7
2005 37.0 53.9 76.3 65.4 36.0
2006 32.1 49.4 73.9 66.6 34.6
2007 31.2 44.1 68.6 73.4 38.8
Total 35.6 52.1 74.9 65.9 37.9
Notes: This table displays statistics on the Bank’s loan portfolio. Results are provided for the
full sample and the following subsamples: Loans with an Amount > 10,000 EUR; Loans with an
Amount > 50,000 EUR; Mortgage loans : Loans with the purpose to finance real estate; Repeat
clients : Loans disbursed to firms that take out more than one loan from the Bank during the
observation period.
Table 3. Loan disbursements
Panel A. Number of loans disbursed
Panel B. Volume of loans disbursed (in million EUR)
Panel C. Share of loan volume disbursed in EUR (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Full sample
Amount >
10,000 EUR
Amount >
50,000 EUR
Non-mortgage
loans (Amount >
10,000 EUR)
Mortgage loans
(Amount >
10,000 EUR)
Repeat clients
(Amount >
10,000 EUR)
Dependent variable:
EUR savings account 0.035*** 0.120*** 0.070 0.037 0.215*** 0.090***
[0.009] [0.029] [0.083] [0.031] [0.048] [0.034]
Disposable income -0.004*** -0.020*** -0.066*** -0.010*** -0.035*** -0.022***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.012] [0.002] [0.006] [0.004]
Leverage -0.008** -0.029** -0.047 -0.029*** -0.058* -0.008
[0.003] [0.012] [0.049] [0.011] [0.034] [0.018]
Sole proprietorship -0.009*** -0.026*** 0.038 -0.033*** -0.013 -0.045***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.029] [0.005] [0.011] [0.008]
Loan number 0.001*** 0.008*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.005**
[0.000] [0.002] [0.005] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002]
Assets 0.010*** 0.036*** 0.060*** 0.025*** 0.050*** 0.044***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.008] [0.004]
Age 0.001 0.002 -0.042* 0.008 -0.013 0.009
[0.001] [0.004] [0.022] [0.005] [0.010] [0.007]
Requested amount 0.023*** 0.097*** 0.200*** 0.062*** 0.154*** 0.095***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.019] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005]
Requested maturity 0.011*** 0.053*** 0.134*** 0.021*** 0.100*** 0.061***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.014] [0.006] [0.011] [0.005]
Mortgage loan 0.031*** 0.095*** 0.090 0.101***
[0.003] [0.010] [0.059] [0.010]
Observations 99,100 17,593 1,995 10,207 6,771 11,470
Mean of dependent variable 0.04 0.18 0.54 0.07 0.36 0.21
Eastimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
R² (pseudo) 0.466 0.325 0.195 0.271 0.203
Wald Chi²-statistic 1,094.97***
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no no no no yes
Table 4. Foreign currency loan demand
Notes: This table reports average marginal effects for firm and loan characteristics from logit estimations. The dependent
variable EUR requested equals one if the firm requested a EUR loan and equals zero otherwise, while all explanatory
variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the industry-branch
level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
EUR requested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Full sample
Amount >
10,000 EUR
Amount >
50,000 EUR
Non-mortgage
loans (Amount
> 10,000 EUR)
Mortgage loans
(Amount >
10,000 EUR)
Repeat clients
(Amount >
10,000 EUR)
Dependent variable:
EUR savings account 0.017*** 0.043 -0.020 0.021 0.080 -0.004
[0.007] [0.030] [0.119] [0.025] [0.074] [0.022]
Disposable income -0.000 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.000] [0.002] [0.017] [0.002] [0.006] [0.003]
Leverage -0.001 -0.016 -0.114* -0.025** -0.019 0.000
[0.002] [0.012] [0.067] [0.010] [0.034] [0.013]
Sole proprietorship -0.002** -0.011** -0.011 -0.012*** -0.002 -0.011*
[0.001] [0.006] [0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.006]
Loan number -0.001** -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.006] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]
Assets 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.008 0.008** 0.012** 0.015***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.015] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003]
Age -0.001 -0.007* -0.024 -0.002 -0.022* -0.011**
[0.001] [0.004] [0.031] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005]
Requested amount 0.017*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 0.058***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.024] [0.008] [0.013] [0.005]
Requested maturity 0.012*** 0.067*** 0.260*** 0.044*** 0.126*** 0.065***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.018] [0.005] [0.012] [0.005]
Mortgage loan 0.014*** 0.065*** 0.040 0.049***
[0.002] [0.011] [0.039] [0.008]
Amount/Requested amount 0.034*** 0.139*** 0.308*** 0.113*** 0.206*** 0.110***
[0.002] [0.011] [0.038] [0.009] [0.021] [0.011]
Maturity/Requested maturity 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.076*** 0.005** 0.029*** 0.016***
[0.000] [0.004] [0.016] [0.002] [0.011] [0.002]
Observations 95,608 14,484 ,914 10,034 4,330 9,088
Mean of dependent variable 0.02 0.10 0.28 0.06 0.19 0.09
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
R² (pseudo) 0.448 0.279 0.310 0.292 0.242
Wald Chi²-statistic 417.77***
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no no no no yes
Table 5. Foreign currency loan supply: Switching loans from BGN to EUR
Notes: This table reports average marginal effects for firm and loan characteristics from logit estimations for the sample of
loans requested in BGN only. The dependent variable EUR granted equals one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals
zero otherwise, while all explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account
for clustering at the industry-branch level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
EUR granted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample:
All loans with
amount >
10,000 EUR
Non-mortgage
loans Mortgage loans Repeat clients
Dependent variable:
EUR interbank funding -0.142 0.002 -0.245 0.017
[0.162] [0.208] [0.354] [0.141]
EUR customer funding 0.903*** 0.785*** 1.528*** 0.887***
[0.241] [0.268] [0.538] [0.227]
Spread differential 0.002 0.002 -0.008 0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.003]
Inflation volatility 0.019 -0.013 0.104*** 0.041***
[0.020] [0.023] [0.037] [0.012]
Interest differential 0.018** 0.023** -0.001 0.005
[0.009] [0.010] [0.017] [0.006]
Forward term spread -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.010 -0.004
[0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003]
Observations 13,048 9,519 3,410 8,081
Mean of dependent variable 0.10 0.06 0.21 0.09
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit
R² (pseudo/adjusted) 0.272 0.285 0.224
Wald Chi²-statistic 325.82***
Firm and loan characteristics yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Branch fixed effecst yes yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no no yes
Notes: This table reports average marginal effects from logit estimations for the sample of
loans with amounts > 10,000 EUR that are requested in BGN. The sample period starts in June
2004 since forward rates are not available before. The dependent variable EUR granted equals
one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals zero otherwise, while all explanatory variables
are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the
industry-branch level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
Table 6. Bank funding, monetary conditions and switching of loan currency
EUR granted
(1) (2)
yes
N = 5,928
no
N = 178
Difference
(1) vs. (2)
yes (2006:Q2 - 2006:Q4)
N = 3,246 0.08 0.20  -0.13***
no (2005:Q3 - 2006:Q1)
N = 2,991 0.04 0.33  -0.28***
Difference  0.03*** -0.12 0.15***
(1) (2)
yes
N = 12,068
no
N = 280
Difference
(1) vs. (2)
yes (2006:Q2 - 2007:Q3)
N = 8,045 0.11 0.25  -0.14***
no (2004:Q4 - 2006:Q1)
N = 4,545 0.05 0.33  -0.28***
Difference  0.07*** -0.08 0.14***
(1) (2)
yes
N = 3,729
no
N = 78
Difference
(1) vs. (2)
yes (2005:Q1 - 2005:Q4)
N = 2,408 0.04 0.33  -0.29***
no (2004:Q3 - 2005:Q1)
N = 1,426 0.06 0.33  -0.27***
Difference  -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02
Panel A. +/- 3 quarters around the start of securitization deal
Panel B. +/- 6 quarters around the start of securitization deal
Table 7. Securitization and loan currency switches: Univariate tests
Notes: This table reports the average likelihood that a loan is granted in EUR after it was
requested in BGN (EUR granted if BGN requested ) for the following subsamples: Column
(1): loans that are Eligible for the Bank's securitization deal based on requested and granted
loan terms (i.e. requested and granted amount up to 350,000 EUR and requested and granted
maturity up to 7 years); column (2): loans that are not eligible for securitization based on
requested and granted loan amount and maturity. Panel A includes all loans disbursed in an
event window of +/- 3 quarters around the start of the securitization deal. Panel B includes all
loans disbursed in an event window of +/- 6 quarters around the start of the securitization deal.
Panel C includes all loans disbursed in an event window of +/- 3 quarters around the
introduction of macroprudential regulations. The Bank started securitizing loans in April 2006
and continued to do this until the end of our observation period. Macroprudential regulations
were introduced in April 2005 and lifted in December 2006. The table also provides T-tests for
differences between groups and F-tests for differences between pairs of groups. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level.
Eligible
         EUR granted if BGN requested
Securitization
Macroprudential
regulations
Eligible
         EUR granted if BGN requested
Securitization
Eligible
             EUR granted if BGN requested
Panel C. +/- 3 quarters around the introduction of macroprudential regulations
(1) (2) (3)
Share of loans with
granted amount and
loan maturity below
thresholds
Granted loan amount
and loan maturity
below thresholds
N = 131
Granted loan amount
and/or loan maturity
not below thresholds
N = 178
Difference
(2) vs. (3)
yes (2006:Q2 - 2006:Q4)
N = 3,246 0.51 0.45 0.20  0.25***
no (2005:Q3 - 2006:Q1)
N = 2,991 0.28 0.16 0.33  -0.16*
Difference 0.23*** 0.29*** -0.12  0.41***
(1) (2) (3)
Share of loans with
granted amount and
loan maturity below
thresholds
Granted loan amount /
loan maturity below
thresholds
N = 252
Granted loan amount
and/or loan maturity
not below thresholds
N = 280
Difference
(2) vs. (3)
yes (2006:Q2 - 2007:Q3)
N = 8,045 0.53 0.51 0.25  0.25***
no (2004:Q4 - 2006:Q1)
N = 4,545 0.33 0.26 0.33 -0.07
Difference 0.19*** 0.25*** -0.08  0.33***
(1) (2) (3)
Share of loans with
granted amount and
loan maturity below
thresholds
Granted loan amount
and loan maturity
below thresholds
N = 37
Granted loan amount
and/or loan maturity
not below thresholds
N = 78
Difference
(2) vs. (3)
yes (2005:Q2 - 2005:Q4)
N = 2,408 0.32 0.26 0.33 -0.07
no (2004:Q3 - 2005:Q1)
N = 1,426 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33
Difference -0.01 -0.40 0.00 -0.40
Table 8. Securitization and simultanous changes in loan terms
Panel A. +/- 3 quarters around the start of securitization deal
         EUR granted if BGN requested
Securitization
Panel B. +/- 6 quarters around the start of securitization deal
Macroprudential
regulations
Notes: This table reports results for loans requested in BGN which are not eligible for seciritization based on their
Requested amount (>350,000 EUR) and / or Requested maturity (> 7 years). The table reports in column (1) the
share of these loans for which the granted loan Amount and Maturity adhered to the securitization criteria (granted
amount up to 350,000 EUR and granted maturity up to 7 years). In column (2) the table reports the likelihood that a
loan is granted in EUR for loans that are eligible for the securitization deal based on granted amount and maturity. In
column (3) the table reports the likelihood that a loan is granted in EUR for loans that are not eligible for the
securitization deal based on granted amount and maturity. Panel A includes all loans disbursed in an event window of
+/- 3 quarters around the start of the securitization deal. Panel B includes all loans disbursed in an event window of +/-
6 quarters around the start of the securitization deal. Panel C includes all loans disbursed in an event window of +/- 3
quarters around the introduction of macroprudential regulations. The Bank started securitizing loans in April 2006 and
continued to do this until the end of our observation period. Macroprudential regulations were introduced in April
2005 and lifted in December 2006. The table also provides T-tests for differences between groups and F-tests for
differences between pairs of groups. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level.
EUR granted
EUR granted
EUR granted
         EUR granted if BGN requested
Securitization
Panel C. +/- 3 quarters around the introduction of macroprudential regulations
             EUR granted if BGN requested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample:
Non-mortgage
loans Mortgage loans
Sole
proprietorships
Non-sole
proprietorships
Number of quarters before /
after securitization starts: +/- 3 Quarters +/- 6 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters
Dependent variable:
Securitization -0.101 -0.072 0.018*** -0.110* -0.032 -0.266**
[0.066] [0.072] [0.004] [0.063] [0.081] [0.121]
Eligible -0.065 -0.067 0.190*** -0.014 0.002 -0.192**
[0.060] [0.063] [0.030] [0.066] [0.080] [0.088]
Securitization*Eligible 0.137** 0.147** 0.203*** 0.057 0.331***
[0.068] [0.072] [0.072] [0.083] [0.119]
Observations 6,106 12,348 4,481 1,625 4,390 1,716
Mean of dependent variable 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.05 0.12
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R² (adjusted) 0.194 0.164 0.086 0.169 0.210 0.182
Firm and loan characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample:
Non-mortgage
loans Mortgage loans
Sole
proprietorships
Non-sole
proprietorships
Number of quarters before /
after securitization starts: +/- 3 Quarters +/- 6 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters +/- 3 Quarters
Dependent variable:
Securitization -0.135* -0.124 -0.137* -0.051 -0.604**
[0.071] [0.075] [0.071] [0.093] [0.263]
Eligible -0.023 0.081 -0.059 0.017 -0.151
[0.116] [0.104] [0.120] [0.186] [0.408]
Securitization*Eligible 0.427*** 0.402*** 0.451*** 0.283** 1.032***
[0.093] [0.092] [0.100] [0.135] [0.362]
Observations 309 532 17 292 235 74
Mean of dependent variable 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.25 0.50
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R² (adjusted) 0.225 0.242 0.224 0.162 0.071
Firm and loan characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 9. Securitization and loan currency switches: Multivariate analysis
Notes: This table reports coefficients from OLS estimations for the sample of loans requested in BGN and with amounts >
10,000 EUR for the periods of three (column 1 and 3-6) and six (column 2) quarters, respectively, before and after the Bank
started securitizing loans in April 2006. Panel A includes loans that are Eligible vs. Non-eligible for securitization based on
the requested and granted amount (up to 350,000 EUR) and the requested and granted maturity (up to 7 years). Panel B
includes only loans which are not eligible based on requested amount (> 350,000 EUR) or requested maturity (> 7 years).
The dependent variable EUR granted equals one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals zero otherwise, while all
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the
industry-branch level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
Panel A. Loans eligible or not eligible for securitization based on requested and granted amount and maturity
Panel B. Loans not eligible for securitization based on requested amount or requested maturity
